Abel Wajnerman Paz
Especialidad:
Filosofía de la neurociencia y la neuroética
Email:
abelwajnerman@gmail.com
Abel Wajnerman posee un Doctorado en Filosofía, obtenido en la Universidad de Buenos Aires en 2014. Ha sido Investigador responsable (IR) en varios proyectos, incluyendo el Fondecyt de Iniciación 11220327 “Explorando los fundamentos conceptuales de los neuroderechos”, el Fondecyt postdoctorado 3180468 sobre “Computación, codificación e información neuronal: problemas en torno a los fundamentos conceptuales de la neurociencia cognitiva”, y proyectos postdoctorales y de Investigador Asistente CONICET en Argentina enfocados en la teoría computacional de la mente y los desafíos de la explicación computacional en neurociencia cognitiva.
También ha participado como Co-Investigador en proyectos Fondecyt Regular sobre conceptos, conexiones causales y predicciones testeables en neurociencia experimental (Nº 1210091) y las implicancias epistemológicas y metafísicas de la penetrabilidad cognitiva en la percepción visual (Nº 1200197). Además, ha sido Investigador Colaborador en el Neurotech Justice Accelerator y en un Planning Grant del Dana Foundation Center en Mass General Brigham/Harvard Medical School, así como en el proyecto BRAINshare de Baylor School of Medicine en EEUU. Fue co-investigador en el proyecto PICT-2014-3422 de la ANPCyT en Argentina, que estudió las relaciones entre arquitecturas cognitivas y explicaciones en ciencia cognitiva.
PUBLICACIONES
A current problem in the philosophy of neuroscience consists in determining how to individuate cognitive capacities using neurobiological evidence. One recent proposal grounded on fundamental insights from mechanistic philosophy is an iterative strategy that cycles between neural mechanisms and cognitive capacities, using the former to individuate the latter and vice versa (Francken et al. Synthese, 200(5):378, 2022). However, this view cannot be applied to a fundamental aspect of research on cognitive capacities. Understanding a capacity requires delineating its behavioral profile by identifying the different effects or phenomena associated with it in different task settings. If mechanisms are necessary for integrating these phenomena into a single capacity in a bottom-up way, the iterative cyclic strategy requires a criterion for assessing the across-context identity of the mechanism, which is missing from this view. However, we argue that introducing this criterion turns the strategy into something else. It requires substituting its bottom-up phase with a bi-dimensional stage in which the capacity and its mechanism are individuated simultaneously through the identification of the generalization that connects them and the assessment of how the generalization behaves across contexts.
Recent cases of forced explantation of neurotechnologies seem to be grounded on a naturalist conception of the body as an entity that cannot have a non-biological object as a proper part. However, this conception has been challenged by functional approaches, according to which if an artifact robustly contributes to the function of a body, it is part of it and should be legally treated as such.
Bublitz (2022) argues that a series of problems would result from revising the law to accommodate a functional view and, for this reason, naturalism is the best option. We claim that it is unacceptable to endorse naturalism for purely pragmatic reasons while recognizing that it is theoretically groundless.
We argue that contemporary versions of Autopoietic Theory can be used to provide a theoretically sound naturalistic view. We articulate a criterion for the attribution of degrees of bodiliness to any given object, depending on how closely it is related to autopoiesis, and then specify a threshold that defines the degree required to be a part of the body. Crucially, according to our view, only a very restricted set of devices can become body parts, which significantly mitigates the legal problems of body/device hybridization.
Edificio de Innovación UC, Piso 2
Vicuña Mackenna 4860
Macul, Chile
Vicuña Mackenna 4860
Macul, Chile